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Bell inequality violations can be used to certify private randomness for use in cryptographic
applications. In photonic Bell experiments, a large amount of the data that is generated comes
from no-detection events and presumably contains little randomness. This raises the question as to
whether randomness can be extracted only from the smaller post-selected subset corresponding to
proper detection events, instead of from the entire set of data. This could in principle be feasible
without opening an analogue of the detection loophole as long as the min-entropy of the post-
selected data is evaluated by taking all the information into account, including no-detection events.
The possibility of extracting randomness from a short string has a practical advantage, because it
reduces the computational time of the extraction.
Here, we investigate the above idea in a simple scenario, where the devices and the adversary
behave according to i.i.d. strategies. We show that indeed almost all the randomness is present
in the pair of outcomes for which at least one detection happened. We further show that in some
cases applying a pre-processing on the data can capture features that an analysis based on global
frequencies only misses, thus resulting in the certification of more randomness. We then briefly
consider non-i.i.d strategies and provide an explicit example of such a strategy that is more powerful
than any i.i.d. one even in the asymptotic limit of infinitely many measurement rounds, something
that was not reported before in the context of Bell inequalities.
I. INTRODUCTION
Sources of randomness have numerous applications: in
algorithms, samplings, numerical simulations, gambling,
and of course cryptography [1–3]. The last application
demands sources that can be certified as being uncor-
related to any outside process or variable, i.e. private
randomness. Typically, the output of a physical pro-
cess (thermal noise, shot noise, ...) is considered ran-
dom in this sense only if certain assumptions are made
on its underlying behavior. The violation of Bell inequal-
ities, however, certifies private randomness in a device-
independent way [4, 5]. From the amount of violation,
one obtains a lower bound on the min-entropy H of the
output string generated by the process [5–7]. This infor-
mation is then sufficient to extract randomness: indeed,
one can design seeded extractors, whose output is a string
of (roughly) H bits guaranteed to be uniformly random,
even according to an external adversary.
A Bell experiment, however, produces much more in-
formation than the mere violation of a single inequality.
For instance, one can estimate the single-run frequencies
p(a, b|x, y) of the outcomes (a, b) conditioned on the set-
tings (x, y). When this knowledge is taken into account,
higher values for the lower bounds on H can in prin-
ciple be obtained [8, 9]. More generally, there may be
other ways to process the data that can lead to improved
bounds on the randomness, as the following example il-
lustrates.
Consider a Bell experiment running for two days, each
day consisting of N  1 runs. Suppose that, on the first
day, the setup produces outcomes that violate the CHSH
inequality maximally; on the second day, for some techni-
cal glitch, the detectors don’t fire, so the list of outcomes
consists only of double no-detection events. Suppose that
the users estimate the amount of randomness generated
using solely the observed CHSH violation I, using the
simple bound H ≥ 1 − log2
(
1 +
√
2− I2/4
)
[5]. Sup-
pose further that they planned to extract randomness
every two day. Over the two day period, they observe
an average CHSH violation of (2
√
2 + 2)/2 ' 2.41 (we
take the convention that no-detection events are mapped
to +1 outcomes), from which they deduce a randomness
rate of ∼ 0.2 bit/run for Alice’s outcomes, that is ∼ 0.4N
bits in total for the two-day period. However, the users
might have chosen to extract randomness at the end of
each day instead. The same techniques certify now 1
bit/run for Alice on the first day and 0 on the second,
for a total of N bits over the two days [10] What hap-
pened is clear: the data contain the information that
two processes are involved; this information was missed
by the overall analysis, but was revealed by the choice of
sorting the data in two blocks.
The example is extreme, but a simple variation is very
relevant: the case in which no-detection events are evenly
spread during the whole duration of the experiment is
a good approximation to the data produced in photon-
ics Bell tests, in which no-detection events constitute a
large fraction of the runs (see e.g. Table I in [11]). No-
detection events come from two processes: the finite ef-
ficiency of the detectors, and the fact that parametric
down-conversion often produces the vacuum state. The
physics of both suggests that these events contain little
or no randomness: it is thus tempting to sort the out-
comes of the Bell test in two groups, the detections and
the no-detections. As in the previous example, this may
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2lead to certify more randomness. Even if it does not, one
may get a practical advantage by extracting randomness
only from the detection events. Indeed, randomness ex-
tractors require an independent random seed: the longer
the initial string, the longer the needed seed and the com-
putational time to output the result; in fact, it is an ac-
tive research direction to construct randomness extractor
with short seed length [3]. Thus, it is beneficial to be able
to extract randomness from a short string.
Here, we investigate the amount of randomness that
can be certified in Bell tests within the subset of detection
events. For this first study, our aim is simply to deter-
mine whether this is actually a viable strategy. We thus
perform our analysis in the simplified scenario in which
the devices and the adversary behave in an i.i.d. way
and in the limit of infinitely many measurement rounds.
If randomness cannot be certified in this simple scenario,
then it can also certainly not be certified in the non-i.i.d.
finite statistics case.
The post-selection of detection events notoriously
opens the detection loophole [12, 13]. It is important
to clarify that our approach does not fall into that trap.
We shall compute a lower bound on the randomness that
can be extracted from a subset of events, but the bound
is obtained by taking into account the whole set of events.
In particular, if the behavior of the devices is compati-
ble with local realism due to the detection loophole, our
method will say that no randomness can be certified in
the post-selected set of detection events.
Let us remark that a similar analysis in the context
of violating local realism, namely the p-value of post-
selected events which does not contain no-detections, has
been done recently [14].
After introducing the technique that we will use to
bound randomness in Section II, we apply it to sev-
eral physically-motivated examples in section III. In Sec-
tion IV we analyse more precisely the effect of post-
selection in a simplified case. A glimpse beyond the i.i.d.
restriction is given in Section V before the conclusion.
II. AVERAGE RANDOMNESS IN
POST-SELECTED EVENTS
Consider a Bell experiment consisting of two sepa-
rate devices in which each party inputs x ∈ X and
y ∈ Y and obtains outputs a ∈ A and b ∈ B, re-
spectively. The behavior of such devices over n succes-
sive runs can be characterized by the – generally un-
known – joint probabilities p(ab|xy) to obtain the out-
put string ab = (a1b1, . . . , anbn) given the input string
xy = (x1y1, . . . , xnyn). The information that an adver-
sary has over the output string can be characterized by a
tripartite quantum distribution p(abe|xyz) where e de-
notes the output the adversary obtains when he makes
a measurement z on a system possibly entangled with
Alice and Bob’s devices. In general e can be a string
of arbitrary size representing the total information that
the adversary can get about Alice and Bob’s outcomes
and z can be an arbitrary measurement that depends on
the information available to the adversary in the protocol
before his measurement.
Here we shall make the following simplifying assump-
tions. First, we will assume that the device behave in
an i.i.d. way and similarly that the adversary extracts
his information in an i.i.d. way by performing at each
run individual measurements zi. We can thus write
p(abe|xyz) = ∏ni=1 p(aibiei|xiyizi). Second, we are go-
ing to assume that Alice and Bob’s marginal p(ab|xy) at
each run are known and given. In this way, we do not
need to take care of estimation. With these assumptions,
finding the adversary’s optimal attack thus amounts at
optimizing some quantity over all tripartite quantum
distributions p(abe|xyz) = 〈Ψ|Ma|x ⊗ Mb|y ⊗ Me|z|Ψ〉
compatible with a given bipartite marginal p(ab|xy) =∑
e p(abe|xyz) = 〈Ψ|Ma|x ⊗Mb|y ⊗ I|Ψ〉.
Let us now introduce the additional ingredient of post-
selection. For this, we consider a bipartition of the joint
output alphabet O = A× B into two sets V (valid sym-
bols) and N . If the outputs at a given round (a, b) ∈ V,
we say that the round is valid, and otherwise, if (a, b) ∈
N , that it is invalid. We refer to the events obtained in
valid runs only as the post-selected events. Our goal is
to estimate how much randomness can be extracted from
these post-selected events.
A priori, an adversary trying to guess the post-selected
events might not have access to the information about
which run turned out to be valid or invalid, since he
should not have access to the outputs observed by the
parties. For simplicity, however, we’ll assume here that
the adversary has access to this information. This allows
him to know exactly which run he should try to guess and
is thus advantageous for him. The amount of randomness
that can be certified in this case thus constitutes a lower
bound on the amount that can be certified when the ad-
versary is not given this information. This assumption
might however be problematic in a non-i.i.d. situation
(see Section V).
We are going to assume in the following that Alice and
Bob use a certain pair of inputs (x¯,y¯) for randomness
generation [15]. Since there is a promise on the marginal
p(ab|xy) and since we do not need to consider how to esti-
mate this quantity, we are going to assume for simplicity
that Alice and Bob always measure their systems using
the inputs (x¯,y¯). Suppose that by measuring n systems,
they obtain m results in V and n−m results in N . The
number m of valid results is a random variable with prob-
ability distribution p(m) =
(
n
m
)
pmx¯y¯(1 − px¯y¯)n−m, where
px¯y¯ =
∑
ab∈V p(ab|x¯y¯) is the single-run probability to ob-
tain a pair of valid results when using inputs (x¯, y¯).
By the i.i.d. assumption, the min-entropy of the m-
elements post-selected string is mHx¯y¯, where Hx¯y¯ is the
single-run min-entropy and is defined below. Applying a
randomness extractor to this string, then yields mHx¯y¯
bits of randomness (such extractors exist up to  cor-
rection, see [16, 17]). The average length of the final
3random string is then
∑n
m=0 p(m)mHx¯y¯ = n px¯y¯Hx¯y¯.
We can also interepret this last quantity as an “average”
min-entropy [18]. The rate of randomness extraction per
use of the device can then be defined as px¯y¯Hx¯y¯.
To complete the analysis, it remains to determine Hx¯y¯.
By definition, the min-entropy is related to the guessing
probability Gx¯y¯ as Hx¯y¯ = − log2Gx¯y¯, where the guessing
probability is the maximal probability that the adver-
sary correctly guesses Alice and Bob’s outputs by per-
forming an optimal measurement on his quantum side
information [19]. Here since we condition on valid runs,
this quantum side information can be represented by the
cq-state ρABE =
1
px¯y¯
∑
ab∈V |ab〉〈ab| ⊗ ρabE , where ρabE =
tr
(
Ma|x¯ ⊗Mb|y¯ ⊗ I |Ψ〉〈Ψ|
)
. The probability that the
adversary then makes a correct guess e = (a, b) of Alice
and Bob’s outputs a, b by performing a measurement z on
his system is, averaged over Alice and Bob’s possible out-
puts, 1px¯y¯
∑
ab∈V tr
(
Mab|zρabE
)
= 1px¯y¯
∑
ab∈V〈Ψ|Ma|x¯ ⊗
Mb|y¯ ⊗ Mab|z|Ψ〉. To determine the maximal value of
this guessing probability, we should maximize it over all
quantum realizations R = (|Ψ〉, {Ma|x}, {Mb|y}, {Me|z})
compatible with the given marginals p(ab|xy) character-
izing Alice and Bob’s devices. We thus have
Gx¯y¯ =
1
px¯y¯
max
R
∑
ab∈V
〈Ψ|Ma|x¯ ⊗Mb|y¯ ⊗Mab|z|Ψ〉 (1)
s.t. 〈Ψ|Ma|x ⊗Mb|y ⊗ I|Ψ〉 = P (ab|xy) .
Following [9] and introducing the bipartite subnor-
malized quantum correlations p˜a′b′(ab|xy) = 〈Ψ|Ma|x ⊗
Mb|y⊗Ma′b′|z¯|Ψ〉 where z¯ denotes the adversary’s optimal
measurement which maximizes (1), the above optimiza-
tion program can be rewritten as
Gx¯y¯ =
1
px¯y¯
max
p˜a′b′
∑
ab∈V
p˜ab(ab|x¯y¯)
s.t.
∑
a′b′∈V
p˜a′b′(ab|xy) = p(ab|xy) (2)
p˜a′b′(ab|xy) ∈ Q˜
where Q˜ denotes the set of unormalized bipartite quan-
tum correlations. The meaning of this program is in-
tuitive: Eve prepares one of |V| systems for Alice and
Bob, one for each outcome pair (a′b′). Each system
is characterized by joint probabilities pa′b′(ab|xy) =
p˜a′b′(ab|xy)/qa′b′ and is prepared with probability qa′b′ =∑
ab p˜a′b′(ab|xy). When Eve prepares system ab, she
guesses that Alice’s and Bob’s outputs are ab, hence
the probability that she guesses correctly on average is
given by the objective function in (2). Eve’s preparations
should of course on average reproduce the given correla-
tions p(ab|xy), hence the first constraint of (2). The sec-
ond constraint simply expresses that Eve’s preparations
should be compatible with quantum theory.
Notice that the constraints in the second line of (1)
and in the second one of (2) involve all outputs a, b and
not only those belonging to the post-selected set V. This
reflects the fact that our analysis is not subject to the
detection loophole.
To summarize, for a given set of bipartite correlations
p(ab|xy) characterising the behavior of the devices, the
figure of merit that we are going to consider in this paper,
which we call the randomness rate, is px¯y¯Hx¯y¯ = px¯y¯ ×
(− log2Gx¯y¯) where Gx¯y¯ is the output of the optimization
problem (2).
In general, it is not possible to carry out explicitly
this optimization as there is no closed form for the set of
quantum correlations Q˜. However, we can upper-bound
the optimal value of (2), and thus lower-bound the ran-
domness rate, through semidefinite programming by re-
laxing the last condition P˜a′b′(ab|xy) ∈ Q˜ and asking
that P˜a′b′(ab|x¯y¯) belongs to some level of the NPA hier-
archy [20–22] instead of the exact quantum set. All op-
timizations reported here were performed at local level 1
of the SDP hierarchy [23].
III. APPROXIMATING PHOTONIC
EXPERIMENTS
The natural benchmark to test our tools are the corre-
lations expected in a Bell experiment using spontaneous
parametric down-conversion (SPDC). In the single-mode
case, such a pulsed SPDC source produces a state of the
form
|ψ〉 = c(g, g¯)etanh(g)a†Hb†V −tanh(g¯)a†V b†H |0〉 , (3)
where aH/V (bH/V ) are polarization modes for Al-
ice (Bob), |0〉 is the vacuum state, and c(g, g¯) =√
1− tanh2 g
√
1− tanh2 g¯ for g, g¯ being the two squeez-
ing parameters. The parties Alice and Bob can measure
this state by placing two detectors after the usual set of
wave plates and a polarization beam splitter. If the de-
tectors do not resolve the number of incident photons,
four cases can then be observed: no detection, a click in
the first detector, a click in the second detector, or two
clicks. In the following, we label a click in the first de-
tector as 0, a click in the second detector as 1, and the
case where either no detection or double detections are
observed as ∅, so that each party effectively produces
one of three possible outcomes. The statistics observed
in this situation as a function of the polarization mea-
surements and the detection efficiency (or equivalently
the losses between the source and the detectors) are de-
scribed in [24].
Using the program (2), we are going to compute lower
bounds on the extractable randomness that can be found
in presence of these statistics in the following cases:
• (a) All outcomes are considered (no post-selection),
i.e. N = Na = {} (the empty set).
• (b) The post-selected string of outcomes does not
contain double occurrences of ∅, i.e. N = Nb =
{∅∅}.
4• (c) The post-selected string of outcomes does not
contain any occurrence of a no-detection event ∅,
i.e. N = Nc = {0∅, 1∅, ∅∅, ∅0, ∅1}.
For the sake of comparison, we will sometimes also con-
sider the case in which the measurements are performed
only when at least one photon pair is produced by the
source, i.e.
• (h) The source is heralded.
An example of heralded experiment is the recent one of
Hensen et al. [25]. Note that in this particular case the
state is encoded in a non-photonic system and always
yields a detection whenever measured.
A. Perfect detectors, variable squeezing
We first consider the case of an experiment with no
loss, and with unit efficiency detectors. In this case it
seems natural to try to generate a maximally entangled
state. We thus set g = g¯ and vary the squeezing g. Vary-
ing g can also be understood as changing the time win-
dow τ during which detectors are monitored. Indeed,
the average number of photon pairs produced within this
window is given by ν = sinh2 g + sinh2 g¯ = 2 sinh2 g.
Figure 1 shows the randomness per run obtained when
setting the polarization measurement according to the
standard CHSH settings. The various discarding strate-
gies yield different amounts of certified randomness, the
largest amount being obtained using strategy (b).
One may be tempted to infer that, for randomness ex-
traction, SPDC sources should be operated with detec-
tion window at ν ∼ 0.6. However, this is the amount
of randomness per run, not per time. For a given pump
power, decreasing the window size τ decreases the aver-
age number of photon pairs in a proportional manner:
ν ∝ τ . At the same time, the number of time windows
increases as ∼ 1/τ ∝ 1/ν. If f(ν) denotes the random-
ness rate per time window, the randomness that can be
certified in a given time interval is thus given, up to a
constant factor, by f(ν)/ν. This quantity is plotted in
the inset of Figure 1, where one can see that total amount
of randomness certified is larger when ν is small, i.e. the
time window τ is small. Therefore, in the asymptotic
limit of infinitely many runs, one should set τ → 0 to
get more randomness per time against an i.i.d adversary.
In this case, the observed data set is dominated by dou-
ble no-detection events, which reinforces the relevance of
our post-selection approach. The regime of small ν is
also the regime in which optical experiments closing the
detection loophole have been performed [11, 27, 28], for
a different reason: in the presence of losses and imper-
fect detectors, the Bell violation disappears if too many
pairs are created, while is preserved in the limit of small
windows [29].
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FIG. 1. Randomness from an SPDC source when setting the
polarization measurement according to the standard CHSH
settings, as a function of the average number of photon pairs
produced in each detection window. No losses and unit ef-
ficiency detectors are assumed. The qualitative shape of the
curves can be understood as follows: for small g, the generated
state contains mostly the vacuum; for large g, the source gen-
erates several pairs, which worsens the statistics [26]. Strate-
gies (a), (b) and (c) certify various amounts of randomness.
Here and in the following figures, all the curves are normalised
to the same number of runs, namely the total number of runs.
Inset: Randomness certified in a given time period when the
length of a time window varies (and the number of time win-
dows varies accordingly). This curve is obtained at constant
pumping g.
B. Imperfect detectors, small squeezing
For the reasons just mentioned, we focus now on
g, g¯ << 1. (i.e. small ν). In this case, a large num-
ber of no-detection events is expected. In spite of this,
we are going to see that strategy (b) continues to per-
form better than the others. Concretely, we choose to
fix the average number of photon per detection window
as ν = 0.01. The state produced by the source can be
approximated to first order in g and g¯ by
|ψ〉 ∝ |0〉+ (tanh(g)a†Hb†V − tanh(g¯)a†V b†H) |0〉 . (4)
In analogy with the partially entangled state cos θ |01〉 −
sin θ |10〉, we define the entanglement parameter of the
state as θ = arctan(tanh g¯/ tanh g).
We now introduce finite detection efficiency η and
study how the certification of randomness varies with this
parameter. We then consider two families of correlations.
In the first, the two-photon state is maximally entangled,
i.e. with θ = pi/4, and we fix the standard CHSH po-
larization measurements. The expected randomness per
run as a function of η is shown in Figure 2. We note
that no randomness can be extracted if η ≤ 82.8% which
is known to be the boundary at which those correlations
50.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 1
Detection efficiency
0
0.002
0.004
0.006
0.008
0.01
0.012
R
an
do
m
ne
ss
 ra
te
(h) heralded
(a) N=N
a
(b) N=N b
(c) N=N
c
FIG. 2. Randomness from a singlet with finite detection
efficiency. Curves (b) and (h) coincide almost perfectly and
approach 0 at the detection loophole limit 0.828 [13].
0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95
Detection efficiency
0
0.002
0.004
0.006
0.008
0.01
0.012
R
an
do
m
ne
ss
 ra
te
(h) heralded
(a) N=N
a
(b) N=N b
(c) N=N
c
FIG. 3. Randomness from Eberhard correlations. Curves
(b) and (h) coincide and approach 0 at the Eberhard limit of
2/3 [12]. Two recent experiments used this Eberhard corre-
lations. In Ref. [28], the overall efficiencies are estimated at
78.6% for Alice and 76.2% for Bob; in Ref. [27], at 74.7% for
Alice and 75.6% for Bob. Thus, strategies (a) and (b) would
extract a very similar (small) amount of randomness. If ef-
ficiencies are increased in the future, strategy (b) should be
preferred.
can be explained with a local model exploiting the de-
tection loophole. The second case is that of Eberhard’s
famous study [12], in which the entanglement parameter
θ depends on the detector efficiency η, and Alice’s mea-
surements are parametrized by two angles α0, α1 which
also depend on η. These parameters are chosen to opti-
mize the violation of a lifting [30] of the CHSH inequality,
in the case where exactly one pair of photons is measured,
for each value of η. The resulting randomness rate is plot-
ted in Figure 3. Again, no randomness can be extracted
below the known detection loophole threshold η ≤ 66.6%.
In both cases we notice again that, within a numer-
ical precision ∼ 10−5, strategy (b) certifies the largest
amount of randomness and in fact recovers the result that
one would obtained with a heralded source (h). The ex-
pected proportion of discarded events is ∼ (1−ν)+ν(1−
η)2, which can be substantial: it is larger than 99% in our
case for all η. Strategy (c), i.e. removing all events where
some no-detection occurred, results in clearly lower ran-
domness per run; and for efficiencies lower than 86% and
85%, no randomness at all is even certified. This kind of
post-selection is thus too strong if one is interested in cer-
tifying an optimal amount of randomness. Strategy (a)
certifies essentially the maximum amount of randomness
for efficiencies η . 90%, but would become suboptimal
as efficiency increases.
IV. UNDERSTANDING WHY ONE CERTIFIES
MORE RANDOMNESS FROM A SUBSET OF
DATA
Let us stress again that in Figures 1-3, all the curves
are normalised to the same number of runs, the total
one. Thus, they show that if a suitable small fraction
of the symbols is processed, a strictly larger amount of
total randomness can be certified, as compared to the case
where all the symbols are processed. In order to shed
light on this behavior, we consider a simplified model
in which the source emits a perfect maximally-entangled
state with probability ν, and the vacuum otherwise (in
other words, compared to the previous section, we neglect
completely the possibility of double detections in each
party’s measurement setup). We also work at perfect
detection efficiency η = 1. The statistics observed with
such a source can be written as
p(ab|xy) =
{
ν 14
(
1 + (−1)a+b+xy 1√
2
)
if a, b ∈ {0, 1},
(1− ν) if a = b = ∅.
.
(5)
Notice that, for the source efficiency ν = 12 , these correla-
tions can be seen as the scrambled version of the two-day
extreme situation mentioned in the introduction.
In Figure 4, we show how much randomness can be
certified for these statistics when ν varies. In this case,
the lower bound on the randomness computed from the
raw data is this time consistantly lower than the one
obtained after removing double no-detections from the
data. In fact, after discarding double no-detections, the
same amount of randomness that could be certified if the
source was heralded is recovered (i.e. it is proportional
to the source efficiency ν).
We thus recover the same behaviour as discussed in
Section III B and in the two-day example of the introduc-
tion. If we don’t consider it an overwhelmingly improb-
able fluctuation, the two-day example clearly suggests a
non-i.i.d. process, for which the possibility of identifying
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FIG. 4. Randomness from a singlet produced with finite
probability ν, with η = 1. Curves (b) and (c) are identi-
cal, since there are no events with one detection and one
no-detection in the raw data (the post-selection procedures
(b) and (c) are actually the same for this correlation). Curve
(h), which gives the randomness from raw string of outcomes
upon the heralding of a successful preparation of the state
(i.e. randomness from the correlation 5), exactly coincides
with curves (b) and (c). Curve (a) lies below the other ones.
two separate processes is easy to understand. Here, on
the contrary, the statistics are manifestly i.i.d. — and
nevertheless, the extraction of randomness based on the
single-run frequencies p(ab|xy) can be improved. We are
going to show that the cause is the same: because of the
structure of the correlations, one can actually identify the
presence of two distinct processes, and the post-selection
of detection events happens to capture this fact. That
the alternation between the two processes is done in an
i.i.d. way, instead of a disruptive way as in the two-day
example, eventually does not matter.
Note first that by definition p(ab|xy) has the block
structure p(ab|xy) = ν q(ab|xy) + (1− ν) r(ab|xy) where
q(ab|xy) =
y 0 1
x a\b 0 1 ∅ 0 1 ∅
0 q1 q2 0 q5 q6 0
0 1 q3 q4 0 q7 q8 0
∅ 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 q9 q10 0 q13 q14 0
1 1 q11 q12 0 q15 q16 0
∅ 0 0 0 0 0 0
(6)
and
r(ab|xy) =
y 0 1
x a\b 0 1 ∅ 0 1 ∅
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
∅ 0 0 1 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
∅ 0 0 1 0 0 1
(7)
It follows that in the decomposition p(ab|xy) =∑
a′b′∈V p˜a′b′(ab|xy) in the second line of the program
(2), every p˜a′b′(ab|xy) must also have this block struc-
ture, since if p(ab|xy) is equal to zero for some a, b, x, y
then p˜a′b′(ab|xy) must also necessarily be equal to zero.
We can thus write p˜a′b′(ab|xy) = νa′b′ qa′b′(ab|xy) + (1−
νa′b′) r(ab|xy) where qa′b′(ab|xy) is normalized and has
the same general form as q(ab|xy) above. The condi-
tion p(ab|xy) = ∑a′b′∈V p˜a′b′(ab|xy) is then equivalent to∑
a′b′∈V νa′b′ = ν and
∑
a′b′∈V qa′b′(ab|xy) = νq(ab|xy).
Furthermore, when we post-select events according to
(b) or (c), the effective set of valid symbols is in both
cases V = {00, 01, 10, 11} since outcome pairs 0∅, 1∅,
∅0, ∅1 have zero probability. The objective value in
(2) therefore only involves the qa′b′(ab|xy) part and is
equal to 1/ν max
∑
ab∈V νab qab(ab|xy), where we used
that px¯y¯ =
∑
ab∈V νab = ν.
All together, we can thus rewrite the optimization (2)
as
Gx¯y¯ =
1
ν
max
∑
ab∈V
νabqab(ab|x¯y¯)
s.t.
∑
a′b′∈V
νa′b′ qa′b′(ab|xy) = ν q(ab|xy) (8)
qa′b′(ab|xy) ∈ Q
where Q denotes the set of normalized quantum correla-
tions. Defining q˜a′b′(ab|xy) = νa′b′/ν × qab(ab|x¯y¯), we
can further rewrite it as
Gx¯y¯ = max
∑
ab∈V
q˜ab(ab|x¯y¯)
s.t.
∑
a′b′∈V
q˜a′b′(ab|xy) = q(ab|xy) (9)
q˜a′b′(ab|xy) ∈ Q˜
This optimization is nothing but the one associated
to a heralded source characterized by the correlations
q(ab|xy) and explains why curve (h) of Figure 4 coin-
cides with curves (b) and (c).
V. GOING BEYOND I.I.D. FOR THE SOURCE
In this section, we are going to relaxing the i.i.d. as-
sumption for the source. We won’t be able to derive
7bounds for the extraction of randomness from the most
general non-i.i.d. source. But we are going to provide
two example of non-i.i.d. strategies that are strictly more
powerful than i.i.d. strategies even in the asymptotic
limit of infinitely many runs. To our knowledge, this is a
feature not found in previous works on randomness from
Bell tests [5, 31, 32] or on quantum key distribution [33].
In the strategies we found, the adversary exploits the
knowledge of whether each outcome is kept or discarded.
As mentioned in Section II, it would be definitely rea-
sonable not to reveal anything, but such scenario may
introduce other security concerns (e.g. the raw key is
private conditional on some other information being kept
private).
Specifically, suppose that the outcomes of run k are
valid, i.e. they are kept for the raw key; the adversary
would like to know their value. In a non-i.i.d. case, the
fact of keeping or discarding the outcome at run k + 1,
an information which we assume the adversary will learn,
may leak some information about the outcome that is
kept at run k. This is similar to the argument of [34]
against reusing QKD devices in the device-independent
level of characterization [35]. Notice that this behaviour
does not require the adversary to have tampered with the
device in a malicious way, it may be simply a defect of
fabrication that the adversary is aware of. For instance,
suppose that the detector corresponding to outcome 0
has an inordinately long jitter time compared to the other
detector: if a detection happens at run k + 1, it means
that the outcome at run k was 1; if no detection, the
outcome at run k was most probably 0.
A. First example
The simplest example we found requires both Alice’s
and Bob’s devices to depend on the previous inputs and
outputs of both sides. Note that this is not in contradic-
tion with the basic assumption in all device-independent
protocols that the two boxes are non-communicating,
since this assumption must only be verified during the
measurement runs. Between measurement runs, how-
ever, boxes could in principle be free to communicate.
For instance, before the measurement runs, the boxes
may open a door within a small time interval to let enter
incoming quantum systems, those generated by and com-
ing from the source. Malicious boxes could take advan-
tage of this interval to exchange the inputs and outputs
obtained in previous runs. In the next subsection, we will
present a more convoluted example that does not require
signalling between the boxes, and thus which also works
if measure are taken to insure that the boxes do not ex-
change such kind of information between measurement
runs.
Consider the i.i.d. correlations obtained when the par-
ties measure a singlet with probability ν, and nothing
with probability 1 − ν. We have encountered this situ-
ation in paragraph IV: for any ν > 0, some randomness
remains in the non-discarded outcomes (see Figure 4).
In all existing protocols, the amount of randomness
that is extracted is determined from a statistical test
which is based on the input and output pair counts
#(x, y) and #(a, b) (or simply relative outcome frequen-
cies #(a, b)/#(x, y). However, the same statistics ob-
tained for ν = 2/5 can be obtained with high probability
when measurements are always performed on a perfect
singlet, but runs with double no-detections are artificially
added by using the following non-i.i.d. rule:
singlet outcomes (a, b) following runs
(0, 0) M
(0, 1) (∅,∅) M
(1, 0) (∅,∅) (∅,∅) M
(1, 1) (∅,∅) (∅,∅) (∅,∅) M
(10)
where M means that an usual measurement is performed
on the perfect singlet to determine the outcome of that
run. In this case, counting the number of successive dis-
carded events fully informs about the value of both par-
ties’ outcomes. Thus, in the non-i.i.d case, and allowing
signalling from one box to the other between measure-
ment runs, no private randomness can be certified from
a non heralded source characterized by ν ≤ 2/5 (un-
less some more complicated processing beyond looking
at simple outcome counts is done).
B. Second example
The second example was found numerically. It is ad-
mittedly hard to find a narrative justification for it, be-
sides the general intuition given above; but we describe
it in detail since, to our knowledge, it is the first example
in which a non-i.i.d. strategy actually outperforms the
i.i.d. ones in a Bell scenario in the asymptotic limit.
Resources. In each run, Alice and Bob share two bi-
nary variables λ, µ ∈ {0, 1} and one out of five quantum
correlations that we denote by Pj with j ∈ {1, 2, 3} and
P ′λ. These correlations are such that Alice’s box has three
outcomes {0, 1,∅}, while Bob’s box has only the two out-
comes {0, 1}: in other words, information about previous
outcomes will be leaked out by Alice’s box detection or
no-detection events. We can write these correlations as
above in the form of Collins-Gisin tables [36]:
P =
y 0 1
x a\b 0 1 0 1
0 · · · ·
0 1 · · · ·
∅ · · · ·
0 · · · ·
1 1 · · · ·
∅ · · · ·
≡
1 PA(0|0) PA(0|1)
PB(0|0) P (00|00) P (00|01)
PB(1|0) P (10|00) P (10|01)
PB(0|1) P (00|10) P (00|11)
PB(1|1) P (10|10) P (10|11)
8because by no-signaling it holds P (a1|xy) = PA(a|x) −
P (a0|xy) and P (∅b|xy) = PB(b|y)−P (0b|xy)−P (1b|xy);
and of course
∑
a P (a|x) =
∑
b P (b|y) = 1. The example
that we find uses:
P1 =
1 0.4453 0.3121
0.6570 0.1708 0.0394
0 0 0
0.3244 0.0247 0.2843
0.4942 0.4195 0.0277
, (11)
P2 =
1 0.8544 0.7373
0 0 0
0.8919 0.8381 0.7209
0.2619 0.1165 0.2617
0.4973 0.4972 0.2354
, (12)
P3 =
1 0.6042 0.5429
0.3979 0.0886 0.0365
0.6021 0.5156 0.5064
0.4588 0.1078 0.4267
0.5412 0.4964 0.1162
(13)
P ′λ=0 =
1 0.6663 0.2038
1 0.6663 0.2038
0 0 0
0.2936 0.1393 0.1112
0.7064 0.5270 0.0926
, (14)
P ′λ=1 =
1 0.9996 0.0015
0 0 0
1 0.9996 0.0015
0.0010 0.0006 0.0004
0.9990 0.9990 0.0011
. (15)
Protocol. One starts with one of the three Pj ’s. As
long as j = 1 or j = 2, the next round will also use one
of the three Pj ’s. When P3 was chosen, the next box will
be P ′λ with the value of λ available in that run. Besides,
if Alice’s outcome from P3 was a = µ, in the next run
Alice uses the box P ′λ; if the outcome was a = 1 − µ, in
the next run Alice ignores P ′λ and outputs ∅. After this,
the process starts again by selecting one of the three Pj ’s.
Now, when x = 0, either outcome 0 or outcome 1 can-
not occur for each potential correlation except P3; and
when P3 is used, its outcomes is fully leaked out in the
next run by the information of whether the subsequent
outcome is kept or not, since P ′λ(∅|x) = 0.
One can check, however, that it would not be pos-
sible to fully guess Alice’s outcome if the same out-
come relative frequencies as the one generated by the
above process where produced by devices behaving in an
i.i.d manner. For instance, let us specify q1 = 0.4097,
q2 = 0.4992, q3 = 0.0911 as the frequencies at which the
Pj ’s are chosen; and p(λ = 0) = 1 − p(λ = 1) = 0.0013,
p(µ = 0) = p(µ = 1) = 1/2. The expected relative fre-
quencies in the asymptotic limit are then peaked around
the following values
P =
q1P1 + q2P2 + q3P3 + q3(p(λ = 0)(P
′
0 + P
′
0
B
)/2 + p(λ = 1)(P ′1 + P
′
1
B
)/2)
q1 + q2 + 2q3
=
1 0.6919 0.5000
0.2800 0.0716 0.0178
0.5000 0.4681 0.3722
0.2800 0.0716 0.2621
0.5000 0.4681 0.1279
, (16)
where P ′λ
B
denote the correlations obtained when Bob
uses P ′λ and Alice outputs ∅. Applying our i.i.d. pro-
gramme to these correlations, one can show that in case
Alice uses x = 0 and the run is not discarded, the
guessing probability on her outcome is upper-bounded
by 0.9874.
VI. CONCLUSION
This work stems from the general remark that ran-
domness extraction does not need to be performed on
all of the raw data and can be done by blocks, or on a
subset of data. In the context of randomness certifica-
tion by Bell inequalities, we have investigated in a simple
scenario whether this could provide an advantage when
post-selecting detection events, which is relevant for pho-
9tonics Bell tests. Because we estimate the randomness
present in a subset of data conditioned on the knowledge
of the whole set of data, this certification does not open
the detection loophole.
Naively, one could a priori think that “full detection”
events, where a detection happens on both side, are the
most important for randomness certification and that dis-
carding all other events would influence only negligibly
the randomness rate. However, our findings show for sev-
eral physically-motivated models of the observed statis-
tics that this is not the case. In particular, Figure 2 and
Figure 3 show that the resistance to detection inefficien-
cies is substantially lower (up to 20% for the scenario
Figure 3) when the post-selected data does not contain
any occurrence of a no-detection event.
The physical intuition that the double no-detection
events contain almost no randomness is, however, vin-
dicated. In some cases, the post-selection actually help
identify a better way of reading the data. From a prac-
tical perspective, our work suggests the possibility of
hashing a small post-selected subset of the original data,
thereby reducing the needed seed length, and ultimately
the computational time. However, one should still embed
this idea within a full randomness certification protocol,
in particular one that can deal with finite statistics and
non-i.i.d. devices.
Regarding this last point, the physical intuition that
double no-detection events can safely be discarded, as
vindicated by our numerical results in an i.i.d. setting,
should, however, be contrasted with the example of Sec-
tion V in which we prove that non-i.i.d. strategies outper-
form i.i.d. ones even in the asymptotic limit of infinitely
many runs, something that had not been reported previ-
ously in the context of Bell inequalities. Whether these
strategies are actually harmful in a more general and re-
alistic case remains to be determined.
In particular, we remind that for simplicity we have
performed our analysis assuming that the adversary gets
to know which runs are kept and which ones are discarded
in the post-selection. This scenario is rather artificial
for randomness generation, insofar as the two boxes for
the Bell experiment don’t need to be in separate labs.
Relaxing this assumption could increase the randomness
rate and the security of the final string. Specifically, the
non-i.i.d. attacks of Section V would not apply anymore
in this case.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We thank Nicolas Brunner and Nicolas Sangouard for
stimulating discussions.
This work is funded by the Singapore Ministry of Ed-
ucation (partly through the Academic Research Fund
Tier 3 MOE2012-T3-1-009) and by the National Re-
search Foundation of Singapore. GdlT acknowledges
support from Spanish FPI grant (FIS2010-14830) and
the subsequent hospitality from CQT. S.P. acknowl-
edges financial support from the European Union un-
der the project QALGO, from the F.R.S.-FNRS under
the project DIQIP, and by the Interuniversity Attrac-
tion Poles program of the Belgian Science Policy Office
under the grant IAP P7-35 photonics@be. S. P. is a Re-
search Associate of the Fonds de la Recherche Scientifique
F.R.S.-FNRS (Belgium).
[1] N. Metropolis and S. Ulam, Journal of the American Sta-
tistical Association 44, pp. 335 (1949).
[2] R. Motwani and P. Raghavan, Randomized Algorithms
(Cambridge University Press, New York, NY, USA,
1995).
[3] S. P. Vadhan, Foundations and Trends in Theoretical
Computer Science 7, 1 (2011).
[4] R. Colbeck, Quantum And Relativistic Protocols For Se-
cure Multi-Party Computation, Ph.D. thesis, PhD The-
sis, 2009 (2009).
[5] S. Pironio, A. Ac´ın, S. Massar, A. B. de la Giroday,
D. N. Matsukevich, P. Maunz, S. Olmschenk, D. Hayes,
L. Luo, T. A. Manning, and C. Monroe, Nature 464,
1021 (2010).
[6] S. Pironio and S. Massar, Phys. Rev. A 87, 012336
(2013).
[7] U. Vazirani and T. Vidick, (2012), arXiv:1111.6054.
[8] J.-D. Bancal, L. Sheridan, and V. Scarani, New Journal
of Physics 16, 033011 (2014).
[9] O. Nieto-Silleras, S. Pironio, and J. Silman, New Journal
of Physics 16, 013035 (2014).
[10] Notice that the difference grows linearly with N , thus it
cannot be accounted for by finite-size corrections related
to processing two N -symbol sets instead of a single 2N -
symbol one.
[11] B. G. Christensen, K. T. McCusker, J. B. Altepeter,
B. Calkins, T. Gerrits, A. E. Lita, A. Miller, L. K.
Shalm, Y. Zhang, S. W. Nam, N. Brunner, C. C. W.
Lim, N. Gisin, and P. G. Kwiat, Phys. Rev. Lett. 111,
130406 (2013).
[12] P. H. Eberhard, Phys. Rev. A 47, R747 (1993).
[13] N. D. Mermin, Annals of the New York Academy of Sci-
ences 480, 422 (1986).
[14] P. Bierhorst, Journal of Physics A: Mathematical and
Theoretical 48, 195302 (2015).
[15] In the case they would rather use several pairs of inputs
for randomness generation, the analysis below could be
extended by using the tools presented in [8].
[16] R. Shaltiel, Bulletin of the EATCS 77, 10.
[17] A. De, C. Portmann, T. Vidick, and R. Ren-
ner, SIAM Journal on Computing 41, 915 (2012),
http://dx.doi.org/10.1137/100813683.
[18] Note that usually, the average min-entropy of a vari-
able A (e.g. the output string) given some informa-
tion M (e.g. the length of the post-selected string)
is defined as − log2
∑
m P (m)G(A|M = m) where
10
G(A|M = m) is the guessing probability of A given
M = m. Here our definition of “average” min-entropy is∑
m P (m)(− log2G(A|M = m)), that is, we inverted the
sum over m and the logarithm. The reason is that in our
scenario, the user, and not only the adversary, actually
knows the value of m and thus a bound on G(A|M = m)
which allows him to apply a different extractor depending
on m.
[19] R. Konig, R. Renner, and C. Schaffner, Information The-
ory, IEEE Transactions on 55, 4337 (2009).
[20] M. Navascue´s, S. Pironio, and A. Ac´ın, Phys. Rev. Lett.
98, 010401 (2007).
[21] M. Navascue´s, S. Pironio, and A. Ac´ın, New J. Phys.
10, 073013 (2008).
[22] S. Pironio, M. Navascue´s, and A. Ac´ın, SIAM J. Optim.
20, 2157 (2010).
[23] T. Moroder, J.-D. Bancal, Y.-C. Liang, M. Hofmann,
and O. Gu¨hne, Phys. Rev. Lett. 111, 030501 (2013).
[24] V. Caprara Vivoli, P. Sekatski, J.-D. Bancal, C. C. W.
Lim, B. G. Christensen, A. Martin, R. T. Thew,
H. Zbinden, N. Gisin, and N. Sangouard, Phys. Rev.
A 91, 012107 (2015).
[25] B. Hensen, H. Bernien, A. E. Dreau, A. Reiserer, N. Kalb,
M. S. Blok, J. Ruitenberg, R. F. L. Vermeulen, R. N.
Schouten, C. Abellan, W. Amaya, V. Pruneri, M. W.
Mitchell, M. Markham, D. J. Twitchen, D. Elkouss,
S. Wehner, T. H. Taminiau, and R. Hanson, Nature
526, 682 (2015).
[26] A. Ma´ttar, P. Skrzypczyk, J. B. Brask, D. Cavalcanti,
and A. Ac´ın, New Journal of Physics 17, 022003 (2015).
[27] L. K. Shalm, E. Meyer-Scott, B. G. Christensen, P. Bier-
horst, M. A. Wayne, M. J. Stevens, T. Gerrits, S. Glancy,
D. R. Hamel, M. S. Allman, K. J. Coakley, S. D.
Dyer, C. Hodge, A. E. Lita, V. B. Verma, C. Lam-
brocco, E. Tortorici, A. L. Migdall, Y. Zhang, D. R.
Kumor, W. H. Farr, F. Marsili, M. D. Shaw, J. A.
Stern, C. Abella´n, W. Amaya, V. Pruneri, T. Jennewein,
M. W. Mitchell, P. G. Kwiat, J. C. Bienfang, R. P. Mirin,
E. Knill, and S. W. Nam, Phys. Rev. Lett. 115, 250402
(2015).
[28] M. Giustina, M. A. M. Versteegh, S. Wengerowsky,
J. Handsteiner, A. Hochrainer, K. Phelan, F. Steinlech-
ner, J. Kofler, J.-A. Larsson, C. Abella´n, W. Amaya,
V. Pruneri, M. W. Mitchell, J. Beyer, T. Gerrits, A. E.
Lita, L. K. Shalm, S. W. Nam, T. Scheidl, R. Ursin,
B. Wittmann, and A. Zeilinger, Phys. Rev. Lett. 115,
250401 (2015).
[29] S. Massar, S. Pironio, J. Roland, and B. Gisin, Phys.
Rev. A 66, 052112 (2002).
[30] S. Pironio, Journal of Mathematical Physics 46, 062112
(2005).
[31] J. Barrett, D. Collins, L. Hardy, A. Kent, and
S. Popescu, Phys. Rev. A 66, 042111 (2002).
[32] R. D. Gill, Statist. Sci. 29, 512 (2014).
[33] R. Renner, Security of Quantum Key Distribution, Ph.D.
thesis, PhD Thesis, 2005 (2005).
[34] J. Barrett, R. Colbeck, and A. Kent, Phys. Rev. Lett.
110, 010503 (2013).
[35] Y. Z. Law, L. P. Thinh, J.-D. Bancal, and V. Scarani,
Journal of Physics A: Mathematical and Theoretical 47,
424028 (2014).
[36] D. Collins and N. Gisin, Journal of Physics A: Mathe-
matical and General 37, 1775 (2004).
